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JN TIIE SlJPJ~EnE COURT OF THE STJ\TL OF UTJ\11 
NOR01AN G. Ci\RTE R, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 15158 
PAULINE CARTER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, THE llONORABLE 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, Judge, Presiding. 
J. FRANKL IN ALLRED 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSEN, for 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Respondent 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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JN TIIE SUPino~ll' COURT 01' THE STJ\TE 01' UTAH 
---------- -------00000-------------------------------
MIR~IJ\N C. CARTEE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
PAULINE CARTER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
POINT I 
Case No. 15158 
TJIE DISTRICT COURT WHICH HEARD TIIE ORIGINAL DIVORCE 
MATTF.R COJmECTLY CONTINUED Tiff OBLIGATION OF THE PLAINTIFF TO 
Pi\Y ALIMONY. 
POINT I I 
THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED AN ATTORNEYS 
HE FOR DEFENSE OF THE APPEAL HEREIN. 
AMENDMENT TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant agrees with the statement of facts of 
plaintiff as far as such statement goes, but adds some salient 
facts omitted by plaintiff. 
The action started in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County with the designated defendant as plaintiff 
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(R 84) and the decree of divorce 
1~ereafter, for some unknown 
a1;ardc'd de[cndzint (R \\. 
plaintiff commenced an 
action in the District Court of Davis County to have the 
of the District Court of Utah County modifiell (R 24,25). Th·, 
case was removecl to Utah County (R 37) ancl h'as treated as an 
Order to Show Cause in the action originally brought in Utah 
County ivhich showed respondent as plaintiff and appellant as 
defendant (TR 3). 
The plaintiff/appellant showed no change of circu~· 
stances from the original decree in this matter h·hich a1,ardeJ 
him property of a sales value of at least $45,000.00 (R SH6 
The parties had heen married over 30 years at the commencemen' 
of the divorce trial (R 57) (TR 17) and had had four children 
(TR 17). The assets that defendant had at the hcar.ing of the 
matter on modification came from the property awarded at the 
original divorce hearing (TR 18), and was substantially the 
same as that awarded to plaintiff (TR 18). There \Vas no sho·,,: 
that plaintiff/appellant no longer had the assets aivarded to'· 
at all at the time of the hearing of the divorce (TR 4). The 
same judge who heard the matter for modification heard the 
original divorce matter and was familiar with the i;hole ca'e 
(TR 17). The plaintiff/appellant, besides his Geneva Stcelr 
f VA · I.le had worked received $300.00 per month · rom a pens Lon. 1 • 
• • T. ble 
at U. S. Steel Company for 27 years in 1976 and is eligi 
for a substantial pension from the U. S. Steel Company (R 34l· 
The plaintiff/appellant's gross earnings in 1975 thro~h 
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,~ovember 22, 1975, were $17,481.16 (EX 2-P). The trial began 
Jlccc111ber 15, 1975 (R 57). As stated by counsel for plaintiff/ 
appellant, there was no change in circumstances at the time of 
the hearing for modification (TR 4). 
The employment of defendant/respondent is and was 
temporary only (TR 16, 17). The defendant taught school while 
she was married for seven years only, and would have set aside 
for retirement about $2,000.00 which might be matched by the 
state (TR 18) (TR 19). The decision of the Court was that while 
the defendant/respondent was earning the sums she was able to 
earn the alimony should be reduced to $100.00 per month (R 14). 
The defendant/respondent was 57 years old as of November 2, 
1976, and would now be 58 years (R 33). 
The trial court did not allow defendant/respondent 
an attorneys fee in this matter (R 14). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW l~S CORRECT IN ITS DECISION. 
The Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court was 
correct in reducing the amount of alimony from $350.00 per 
month to $100.00 per month. The Honorable District Judge was 
familiar with the case, having tried the matter in the first 
instance. The parties had been married 30 years, had reared 
four children. The defendant, during the time of her marriage, 
worked seven years. The plaintiff at the time of the divorce 
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matter 1vas carniu.0 substant.iall)' O"~r $1~ (llJCl 110 
"° ' c . I ' • ]'CT )'CJ I a I. 
in aclcli t ion had an income from ~1 Jll'lls ion o [ s-uo oo 
.\ . per 1110:1: 
I I e w o u 1 cl be en t it 1 c d to s uh st ant i a J l' '0 11 s .L· o ii l f - f 
c - )Cne J ts ro111 ti" 
U. S. Steel Company. Jn aclcli.tion, he received an equal ar
11
ou. 
of property as was received by the Jefendant. Tiw defendant 
had the courage to go out and look for a job which must have 
been contemplated at the time of the divorce in this matter. 
The job defendant/respondent did receive ivas only tempo ran 
and at her age she could not expect more than that. It woul.' 
be unconscionable and unfair for the Court to conclude that, 
would not. be entitled to any alimony and that she would have 
to deplete the amount awarded her under the decree of divorce 
and when that was done, become a public charge. 
The Trial Court is allowed consi.de rah le latitude c 
discretion and its finding and decree will not be overturned 
unless there has been a clear abuse of such discretion. In 
the case of \l/hiteheRcl vs. Whitehead (1965), 397 I'. 2d, 16Ut: 
2d 197, on page 988, the Court stRted: 
"Due to the prerogatives reposed in him under the. 
law and to his advantaoed position, the tnal JUcl;c 
must necessarily be allowed a wide latitude of . 
discretion in such matters, and his j uclgment shou:; 
not be changed lightly, nor at all unlessundert, 
fact shown by the evidence it works a man1~ 5 t 
inequity or injustice". 
To the same effect are the cases, La1"1or vs· L~· 
(1952) 121 Utah 201, 240 P. 2d 271; ~litchell vs. Mite~. 
-'--( _l _9 _7 4~)'-'''-----5_2 7 p . 2 d l 3 5 9 , Utah 2d 
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In the latter case, 
the hu.-ob;1J1(l sought to h;1ve an award for alimony reduced. The 
tri:il cottrt rn;Ldc some reduction but the husband, not being 
satisficcl, appealed the matter. The Court said as set forth 
on page 310 as follows: 
"This proceeding seeking to modify the divorce 
decree is in equity; and it is the prerogative of 
this court to review the evidence, to make its 
own findings, and to substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court when the ends of justice 
so require. However, due to the prerogatives and 
advantaged position of the trial court, we pursue 
that broad authorization under certain rules of 
review which are now well established: Its actions 
are indulged with a presumption of validity and 
correctness and the burden is upon the appellant 
to show a basis for upsetting them: either (1) that 
findings have been made when the e•idence clearly 
preponderates the other way; or (2) that there 
has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error; or (3) that it appears plainly that there 
has been such an abuse of discretion that an 
inequity or injustice has resulted." 
Certainly there was no abuse of discretion in the 
instant case and it is respectfully submitted that the trial 
court would have been in error if it had terminated alimony. 
The cases cited by plaintiff/appellant were decided 
on their own peculiar facts and it is respectfully submitted 
that such cases would not be controlling here. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED AN ATTORNEY'S FEE 
FOR TH[ DEFENSE OF THE APPEAL. 
The trial court did not award the defendant an attor-
ney's fee in the matter of the request for a modification. The 
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<lefendant has been required to dC'fcncl the appeal here iii, dnJ ,, 
would seem proper that the Supreme Court should allow ;i 11 
attorney's fee for the use and benefit of defendant's attorn 
as the plaintiff is well able to respond. It is submitted C· I 
the Court could do so under the ruling in the case, Elrnin0er 
-~, 
Ehninger (Utah, September 13, 1977), S69_J~~lJ21· At 
an attorney's fee could be set by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
was correct in its determination to refuse to terrntnate ali11;: 
and to hold that plaintiff should pay clefenclant/responclent 
$100.00 per month as alimony. ' 
' I
This Honorable Court ls further urged to direct the I 
! 
allowance of an attorney's fee for the defendant in the defcn, 
of the appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
~lailell tivo copi.es of the foregoing to J. Franklin 
i\llrc<l, attorney for plaintiff/appellant, 321 South Sixth East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this _)J.-'(t,_clay of January, 1978, 
first class postage prepaid. 
~ ILLI V. C~RISTENSEN, Attorney 
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